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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomic analyses of capital controls face a number of imposing challenges and have yielded
mixed results to date. This paper takes a different approach and surveys an emerging literature that
evaluates various microeconomic effects of capital controls and capital account liberalization.
Several key themes emerge. First, capital controls tend to reduce the supply of capital, raise the cost
of financing, and increase financial constraints - especially for smaller firms, firms without access
to international capital markets and firms without access to preferential lending. Second, capital
controls can reduce market discipline in financial markets and the government, leading to a more
inefficient allocation of capital and resources. Third, capital controls significantly distort decision-
making by firms and individuals, as they attempt to minimize the costs of the controls or even evade
them outright. Fourth, the effects of capital controls can vary across different types of firms and
countries, reflecting different pre-existing economic distortions. Finally, capital controls can be
difficult and costly to enforce, even in countries with sound institutions and low levels of corruption.
This microeconomic evidence on capital controls suggests that they have pervasive effects and often
generate unexpected costs. Capital controls are no free lunch.
Kristin J. Forbes






I.  Introduction 
The free movement of capital can have widespread benefits. Capital inflows can provide 
financing for high-return investment, thereby raising growth rates. Capital inflows—
especially in the form of direct investment—often bring improved technology, 
management techniques, and access to international networks, all of which further raise 
productivity and growth. Capital outflows can allow domestic citizens and companies to 
earn higher returns and better diversify risk, thereby reducing volatility in consumption 
and income. Capital inflows and outflows can increase market discipline, thereby leading 
to a more efficient allocation of resources and higher productivity growth. In order to 
obtain these widespread benefits of free capital flows, most developed countries and 
many developing countries have lifted most of their capital controls.  
 
In the spring of 1997 there was such widespread support for free capital flows that the 
IMF Interim Committee suggested amending the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to extend 
its jurisdiction to include capital movements and make capital account liberalization a 
purpose of the IMF.
1 Soon after this recommendation was announced, however, a series 
of financial crises spread across Asia and disproportionately affected countries that had 
recently liberalized their capital accounts. In contrast, several Asian countries that had 
maintained more stringent capital controls—such as China and India—emerged from the 
crisis relatively unscathed. These experiences caused a reassessment of the desirability of 
capital controls, especially for emerging markets and developing economies.  
 
In a sharp sea change, many policymakers and leading economists now support the use of 
capital controls, especially taxes on capital inflows, in some circumstances. For example, 
former U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who actively encouraged emerging 
markets to open their capital accounts in the mid-1990’s, has expressed support for 
controls on capital inflows.
2 A series of reports by the G-22 in 1998 raised concerns 
                                                 
1 The IMF’s charter requires that member countries have convertible currencies for the purposes of current 
account transactions, but not capital account transactions. 
2 For example, see Rubin and Weisberg (2003), pg. 257.   2
about capital account liberalization and cautiously endorsed taxes on capital inflows.
3  
Even the Economist magazine, traditionally a supporter of the free movement of goods 
and capital, wrote: “…some kinds of restriction on inflows (not outflows) of capital will 
make sense for many developing countries…Chile’s well-known system…was a success 
worth emulating.”
4 Possibly even more surprising, senior officials from the IMF, 
formerly the bastion of capital market liberalization, have expressed support for taxes on 
capital inflows. For example, Stanley Fischer, former First Deputy Managing Director of 
the IMF stated: “The IMF has cautiously supported the use of market-based capital 
inflow controls, Chilean style.”
5 
 
One of the most common justifications for this sea change in attitudes and recent support 
for capital controls is the lack of empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account 
liberalization. If lifting capital controls does yield net benefits, then these benefits should 
be measurable and identifiable in empirical analysis. Although an extensive literature has 
attempted to measure the macroeconomic effects of capital account liberalization, this 
literature is generally interpreted as being inconclusive. For example, a recent survey of 
the empirical literature on capital controls by authors in the IMF research department 
concludes: “…if financial integration has a positive effect on growth, there is as yet no 
clear and robust empirical proof that the effect is quantitatively significant”.
6 Similarly, 
Eichengreen (2001) writes: “Capital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one 
of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day...Empirical analysis has 
failed to yield conclusive results.”  
 
This interpretation that the empirical evidence on capital controls is inconclusive, 
however, overlooks a number of recent studies using microeconomic data. These studies 
provide persuasive evidence on the different effects of capital controls and capital 
account liberalization. The studies cover a variety of countries and periods, use a range of 
                                                 
3 See Group of Twenty-Two reports released in 1988: Report of the Working Group on Transparency and 
Accountability, Report of the Working Group on Strengthening Financial Systems, and Report of the 
Working Group on International Financial Crises. 
4 Economist (2003). 
5 Fischer (2001).  
6 Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).   3
approaches and methodologies, and build on several different literatures. By focusing on 
individual experiences and/or specific effects of capital controls, this microeconomic 
approach can yield more concrete and robust evidence than the cross-country 
macroeconomic studies that assume capital controls have similar effects across countries 
and periods. Granted, this microeconomic approach has the disadvantage that it is 
difficult to generalize from individual country experiences. It also has the disadvantage 
that it is difficult to aggregate the different microeconomic results to capture the 
macroeconomic effects of capital controls. Nonetheless, this new series of 
microeconomic studies provides compelling and robust evidence of the pervasive effects 
of capital controls.  
 
This paper surveys these diverse microeconomic studies and attempts to develop a more 
coherent picture of the microeconomic evidence on capital controls. Several key themes 
emerge. First, capital controls tend to reduce the supply of capital, raise the cost of 
financing, and increase financial constraints—especially for smaller firms and firms 
without access to international capital markets. Second, capital controls can reduce 
market discipline in financial markets and the government, leading to a more inefficient 
allocation of capital and resources. Third, capital controls significantly distort decision-
making by firms and individuals as they attempt to minimize the costs of the controls, or 
even evade them outright. Fourth, the effects of capital controls can vary across different 
types of firms and countries, reflecting different pre-existing economic distortions. 
Finally, capital controls can be difficult and costly to enforce, even in countries with 
sound institutions and low levels of corruption.  
 
Although this literature examining the microeconomic effects of capital controls is only 
in its infancy and much more careful analysis remains to be done, the combination of 
results is compelling. These papers use diverse methodologies to examine very different 
aspects of capital controls in a range of countries and time periods, yet most find a 
consistent result; capital controls have pervasive effects, yield many unexpected costs, 
and can distort the allocation of resources, all of which can hinder market efficiency. 
Granted, capital controls may also have some costs and benefits that are not addressed in   4
these microeconomic papers—such as reducing a country’s vulnerability to currency 
crises.
7 Moreover, in the presence of existing market distortions, capital controls can be a 
“second-best” policy.
8 Therefore, this survey is not, in any way, a full cost-benefit 
analysis of capital controls. Countries evaluating whether to impose capital controls or 
liberalize their capital accounts need to consider factors other than this microeconomic 
evidence. The results in this paper do clearly suggest, however, that capital controls 
(including taxes on capital inflows) create substantial microeconomic distortions. The 
recent sea change in views supporting capital controls (and bolstered by the inconclusive 
macroeconomic evidence) appears to be premature. The microeconomic evidence on 
capital controls presents a clear picture; capital controls have pervasive effects and can 
generate substantial, unexpected costs. Capital controls are no free lunch. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II discusses reasons why the 
macroeconomic evidence on capital controls has been inconclusive, to date. Section III 
surveys the microeconomic evidence on how capital controls affect the supply and cost of 
capital. Section IV reviews the evidence on how controls affect market discipline and the 
allocation of capital. Section V describes how controls can affect the behavior and actions 
of firms and individuals. Section VI briefly discusses the challenges to implementing and 
enforcing capital controls. Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II.  Inconclusive Macroeconomic Evidence on Capital Controls 
The macroeconomic literature has had limited empirical success, to date, in providing 
robust evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization.
9 Most papers in this 
literature use a variant of the standard cross-country growth regression developed by 
Robert Barro to test if the presence of capital controls or capital account liberalization is 
correlated with higher economic growth. Prasad et al. (2003) provide a detailed survey of 
this literature and argue that the results are inconclusive. More specifically, of the 14 
                                                 
7 See Block and Forbes (2004) for an evaluation of the various costs and benefits of capital controls. 
8 For example, if capital market inefficiencies allow companies to overborrow, capital controls that limit 
the supply of loans may minimize the initial distortion. 
9 For excellent surveys of this literature, see Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002), Eichengreen (2001), or 
Prasad et al. (2003).   5
recent papers they examine, three find a positive effect of financial integration on growth, 
four find no effect, and seven find mixed results. The only consistency in the papers 
surveyed is that none find evidence that capital account liberalization significantly 
reduces growth. Prasad et al. (2003) also perform their own analysis, with the key result 
replicated in Figure 1. They find no significant relationship between financial openness 
and the growth in real per capita income across countries—even after controlling for 
standard variables in this literature.
10 
 
There are several possible explanations for these conflicting results and lack of consensus 
in the macroeconomic literature.
11 First, it is extremely difficult to accurately measure 
capital account openness.
12 Many studies use rough numerical indices of different 
policies and regulations, but even the more carefully constructed measures cannot capture 
the complexity and effectiveness of a country’s liberalization. Due to these problems, 
other studies have used de facto measures of integration (such as capital flows or foreign 
asset holdings). These are also problematic since some countries with large capital 
inflows still maintain relatively strict capital controls (such as China), while other 
countries with relatively unrestricted capital accounts receive little foreign capital (such 
as many African nations). Still other studies have examined market comovement to 
measure integration with international markets, but these studies face the challenge of 
controlling for other factors that could cause markets to commove—such as global 
shocks or similar asset structures. A final approach has been to study onshore-offshore 
interest rate differentials. This approach is also problematic since not only are these 
differentials only available for a limited set of countries, but also interest rate differentials 
could move due to a number of factors other than capital account liberalization. 
 
Second, different types of capital flows and capital controls may have different effects on 
growth and other macroeconomic variables. For example, recent work suggests that the 
                                                 
10 The control variables include: initial income, initial schooling, average investment/GDP, political 
instability, and regional dummies.  
11 For a more thorough discussion of these challenges, see Eichengreen (2003), Chapter 3, Prasad et al. 
(2003), or Magud and Reinhart (2004). 
12 See Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) for an excellent discussion of different measures of capital 
account openness.   6
benefits of foreign direct investment may be greater than that of other types of capital 
flows. Reisen and Soto (2001) examine the impact of six different types of capital flows 
on growth and find that only two—FDI and portfolio equity flows—are positively 
associated with growth. Henry and Lorentzen (2003) argue that equity market 
liberalizations are more likely to promote growth than debt market liberalizations. Other 
papers argue that controls on capital inflows may be less harmful than controls on capital 
outflows, because controls on inflows may be viewed as a form of prudential regulation, 
while controls on outflows may be viewed as a lack of government commitment to sound 
policies. For example, Rossi (1999) finds that controls on capital inflows reduce the risk 
of a currency crisis, while controls on capital outflows heighten the risk. Moreover, even 
the sequence in which different types of capital controls are removed may determine the 
aggregate impact. For example, lifting restrictions on offshore bank borrowing before 
freeing other sectors of the capital account may increase the vulnerability of a country’s 
banking system (as seen in Korea in the mid-1990’s). 
 
Finally, the impact of removing capital controls could depend on a range of other, hard-
to-measure factors that are difficult to capture in simple cross-country regressions, such 
as a country’s institutions or corporate governance. For example, Chinn and Ito (2002) 
show that financial systems with a higher degree of legal and institutional development 
benefit more, on average, from liberalization.
13 Gelos and Wei (2002) show that countries 
with greater transparency are not only more likely to attract international equity 
investment, but are less vulnerable to herding and capital flight during crises. Closely 
related, there may be “threshold effects” that are difficult to capture in linear regressions. 
More specifically, countries may need to attain a certain level of financial market 
integration or overall economic development before attaining substantial benefits from 
lifting capital controls. For example, Klein and Olivei (1999) find that capital account 
openness only stimulates financial development in OECD countries. Moreover, most 
countries that remove their capital controls simultaneously undertake a range of 
additional reforms and undergo widespread structural changes. Therefore, it can be 
                                                 
13 Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) develop a theoretical model of why financial development is a 
key variable determining the impact of capital account liberalization.   7
extremely difficult to isolate the specific impact of removing capital controls during these 
transition periods. 
 
Given all of these challenges to measuring the impact of capital controls, it is not 
surprising that the empirical literature has had difficulty documenting the effect of capital 
controls on growth at the macroeconomic level. Moreover, to put these challenges in 
perspective, the current status of this literature is similar to the earlier literature on how 
trade liberalization affects growth. Economists generally believe that trade openness 
raises economic growth, but most of the initial work on this topic (which used the same 
cross-country framework as these studies of capital account openness) also reached 
inconclusive results. In some cases trade liberalization appeared to have a positive 
correlation with economic growth, but in most cases these results were not robust to 
sensitivity testing. Stanley Fischer recently made this point: “With regard to empirical 
evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization, I believe we are roughly now 
where we were in the 1980’s on current account liberalization—that some evidence is 
coming in, but that it is at this stage weak and disputed.
14 Since accurately measuring 
capital account liberalization and its interactions with other key variables may be even 
more difficult than for trade liberalization, it is not surprising that the initial work in this 
area has generated mixed results to date. 
 
Although the macroeconomic empirical evidence on how trade openness affects growth 
took years to develop, at a much earlier date several papers using microeconomic data 
and case studies found compelling evidence that trade liberalization raises productivity 
and growth. Similarly, recent work using microeconomic and case-study evidence has 
been much more successful than the macroeconomic literature in documenting the costs 
of capital controls. Although case studies have shortcomings, such as the difficulty 
controlling for other simultaneous events and generalizing to different countries and 
experiences, this microeconomic approach can avoid many of the problems with the 
macroeconomic, cross-country literature. Moreover, this microeconomic approach can 
                                                 
14 Fischer (2003), pg. 14.   8
facilitate a much more detailed measurement of exactly how capital account liberalization 
affects the allocation of resources and market efficiency.  
 
 
III.  Capital Controls and the Supply and Cost of Capital 
Lifting capital controls should allow capital to flow where it can earn the highest 
expected rate of return. Since capital is relatively scarce in low-income, labor-intensive 
economies, the return to capital would be expected to be higher, on average, than in 
capital-abundant, wealthy countries. Therefore, standard economic theory suggests that 
when emerging markets lift their capital controls, capital should tend to flow in from 
wealthier countries. Capital inflows could generate substantial benefits, such as providing 
capital for investment, making advanced technology available, and spurring 
competitiveness.  
 
This simple prediction, however, does not hold for many countries. Most capital currently 
flows from developing to developed countries or between developed countries—not from 
developed to developing countries. Figure 2 shows that emerging markets have been net 
exporters of capital, instead of net importers, since 2000. Even before 2000 when 
emerging markets were net capital importers, their volume of capital inflows was much 
lower than might be expected given their relative scarcity of capital. One reason why 
capital inflows to developing countries may be so low is the greater prevalence of capital 
controls in these markets. Some low- and middle- income countries that have lifted their 
capital controls, however, still experience net capital outflows.  
 
There are a number of reasons why capital might flow from capital-scarce to capital-rich 
countries, even in the absence of capital controls. First, the enforceability of property 
rights is weak in most developing countries. Second, informal administrative barriers, 
(such as corruption, the absence of transparent rules for investment, and the scarcity of 
trained, professional civil servants) can discourage foreign investment in developing 
countries. Third, lower levels of human capital in developing countries can reduce   9
productivity.
15 Finally, many developing countries have a history of default and 
substantially higher credit risk.
16 All of these factors can reduce the expected return to 
capital in developing countries, despite their relative scarcity of capital. For all of these 
reasons, if emerging markets lift their capital controls, capital could actually flow out, 
instead of into the country. As a result, it is difficult to predict, a priori, how lifting 
capital controls will affect the supply of capital in a country. 
 
Moreover, lifting capital controls can affect the cost of capital not only by affecting the 
supply of capital, but also by allowing investors to expand their portfolio of asset 
holdings to better diversify risk. Since asset returns in an individual country are not 
perfectly correlated with global asset returns (or returns in any other individual country), 
removing capital controls can facilitate international risk sharing. A greater 
diversification of risk will reduce the volatility of expected portfolio returns, thereby 
reducing the cost of capital.
17  
 
A.  The Cross-country Evidence 
Several microeconomic studies address these issues by assessing how lifting capital 
controls affects equity markets, the cost of capital, and financial constraints for different 
types of firms. Chari and Henry (2004b) examines the impact of removing controls on 
stock market investment on different types of firms in 11 emerging markets. It finds that 
when publicly-listed firms become eligible for foreign ownership, they experience an 
average stock price revaluation of 15.1% and a significant fall in their average cost of 
capital (with the risk-free rate of return falling between 5.9% and 9.1%, depending on the 
specification).
18 The impact on the expected returns of individual firms is directly 
proportional to the firm-specific changes in systematic risk resulting from the 
liberalization. These affects are also greater for stocks which become “investible” (i.e., 
which can by purchased by foreigners after liberalization) as compared to firms which are 
                                                 
15 See Lucas (1990). 
16 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
17 See Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for a formal model and more detailed discussion of this effect. 
18 These results are supported by several macroeconomic studies of how liberalizations affect equity 
markets. For example, Henry (2000) shows that the mean growth rate of private investment increases by 
about 22 percentage points over the 3 years after liberalizations in emerging markets. Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) shows that the cost of capital decreases by between 5 and 75 basis points after liberalizations.    10
“noninvestible” (i.e., remain off-limits for foreign investment). These results suggest that 
the supply of capital increases and the cost of capital decreases after removing capital 
controls on equity investment, although the effects will vary across different types of 
firms. 
 
A number of studies assess the impact of removing capital controls on the supply and 
cost of capital by using a different approach—measuring how capital controls affect the 
financing constraints of different types of companies. Financing constraints are generally 
measured as the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, while controlling for a number of 
firm-level variables (including investment opportunities). Harrison, Love and McMillan 
(2004) follows this approach and uses an extensive cross-country, time-series, firm-level 
data set.
19 The study finds that restrictions on capital account transactions tend to increase 
firms’ financing constraints. These financial constraints are greater for firms that are 
domestically-owned (as compared to those with either foreign ownership or assets), 
which the authors interpret as being “consistent with the hypothesis that foreign 
investment is associated with a greater reduction in the credit constraints of firms which 
are less likely to have access to international capital markets.”
20 Restrictions on capital 
flows other than capital account transactions—such as on import surcharges or surrender 
requirements for exporters—have no impact on firms’ financial constraints. The study 
also finds that increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is associated with reduced firm 
financing constraints—although a number of factors other than lifting controls on capital 
inflows will determine FDI flows.  
 
Several studies use broader measures of liberalization and also find that greater 
liberalization decreases financial constraints in a panel of firms and countries. One of the 
most common measures of liberalization is financial liberalization—which generally 
includes lifting controls on foreign investment in the financial sector, as well as lifting 
controls on interest rates and reducing directed-credit programs. For example, Laeven 
                                                 
19 Capital controls are measured using different dummy variables for the five categories of capital controls 
in the IMF’s Trade and Exchange Restrictions. This measure of capital controls is imprecise and its 
problems are discussed in the literature surveyed in Section II. 
20 Harrison, Love and McMillan (2004), pg. 272.   11
(2003) constructs a new measure of banking sector liberalization that includes several 
factors in addition to removing barriers to bank entry by foreign investors. Using this 
measure, the study finds that financial liberalization significantly reduces financing 
constraints for small firms, with an 80 percent average reduction in the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. Laeven (2003) also finds that large firms tend to be less 
financially constrained before liberalization and are less likely to experience a reduction 
in financial constraints afterward. There is even some evidence that large firms may 
experience an increase in financial constraints after bank liberalizations. The study 
suggests this may reflect that “in many developing countries, large firms had access to 
preferential (directed) credit during the period before financial liberalization. This form 
of favoritism is likely to decrease during financial liberalization.”
21   
 
Other papers expand beyond the banking sector and use even broader measures of 
financial liberalization to examine the microeconomic impact on firm-financing 
constraints.
22  For example, Love (2003) uses an index of financial development that 
includes market capitalization, value traded, and the share of credit going to the private 
sector. Although this study does not explicitly test the relationship between this measure 
of financial development and capital account liberalization, other work shows that capital 
account liberalization tends to significantly increase financial market development.
23 
Love (2003) finds a strong negative relationship between financial market development 
and financing constraints for all types of firms. It also finds that smaller firms have 
significantly greater financial constraints than larger firms in less financially developed 
countries.  
 
B.  Evidence from Individual Countries 
This series of studies using a range of different statistics to measure capital account 
liberalization and its impact on firm-financing constraints has utilized cross-country, 
firm-level data. Although cross-country data has the obvious advantage of being able to 
                                                 
21 Laeven (2003), pg. 25. 
22 Closely related, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that firms in countries with a more active 
stock market and large banking sector grow faster than they could using only internally-generated funds. 
23 For example, see Klein and Olivei (1999). Also see Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for an excellent survey of 
this literature.   12
test for common relationships across different countries, it has the disadvantage of 
aggregating across very different liberalization experiences and relying on more limited 
data that is only available across countries. In order to avoid these problems, several 
studies have focused on individual country experiences with capital account liberalization 
and firm-financing constraints. 
 
One country that has received substantial attention is Chile. Chile enacted taxes on capital 
inflows (the encaje) from 1991 to 1998. This experience is useful for case studies not 
only because it is generally cited as one of the most successful examples of capital 
controls, but also since the enactment and then removal of the tax provides a useful time-
series dimension to assess its impact.
24 Forbes (2003) examines how the encaje affected 
investment and financial constraints for different types of publicly-traded firms in Chile. 
Figure 3, which is replicated from the paper, shows that investment growth was higher 
for smaller, publicly-traded firms than larger firms both before and after the encaje 
(which is a standard result in the finance literature). During the period that the capital 
controls were in place, however, investment growth plummeted for smaller companies 
and was generally lower than for larger companies. A more formal empirical analysis in 
the study that controls for a range of variables confirms these results and indicates that 
the encaje significantly increased financial constraints for smaller, publicly-traded 
companies, but not for larger firms.  
 
Gallego and Hernández (2003) uses a different estimation technique to examine the 
impact of capital controls in Chile, but finds similar results. This study shows that the 
encaje significantly increased the cost of external funding for Chilean firms, although the 
average effect was small in magnitude. These effects also vary substantially across 
different types of firms. For example, the impact of the encaje on financing costs for 
smaller firms was about 60 basis points higher than for firms that could issue securities 
abroad. Gallego and Hernández (2003) also examines the impact of lifting restrictions on 
capital outflows in Chile. In contrast to the effect of the encaje, lifting controls on capital 
                                                 
24 See Forbes (2003) for more information on the encaje and the literature assessing the impact of these 
capital controls.   13
outflows increases the cost of funding for all types of firms, although the magnitude of 
the effect is small. The paper states that controls on capital outflows by “keeping national 




Although most other countries do not provide as clear a natural experiment to test the 
impact of capital account liberalization as the Chilean encaje, other studies have focused 
on how broader measures of financial liberalization affect firm-financing constraints. For 
example, Gelos and Werner (2001) examines the impact of widespread financial market 
liberalization in Mexico in the late 1980’s on fixed investment in Mexican manufacturing 
firms.
26 The study finds that after financial market liberalization, financial constraints 
were significantly eased for smaller companies, although not larger companies. 
Liberalization may not have reduced financial constraints for larger companies for two 
reasons. First, larger companies had much lower financial constraints before 
liberalization. Second, larger companies were more likely to have stronger political 
connections that provided better access to directed credit at preferential rates before 
liberalization.  
 
Other studies examine the impact of broader financial market liberalizations in other 
Latin American countries. Gallego and Loayza (2000) focuses on Chilean firms between 
1985 and 1995 and finds that firms were financially constrained before liberalization 
(during the period from 1985 to 1990), and these constraints were significantly reduced 
after liberalization (from 1991 to 1996). The paper does not test for the impact of the 
encaje (which was enacted mid-way through the later period), or differentiate between 
large and small firms.
27 Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996) focuses on Ecuadorian 
firms in the 1980s and finds that capital market imperfections caused smaller and 
younger firms to be more financially constrained than older firms. Financial constraints 
                                                 
25 Gallego and Hernandez (2003), pg. 243. 
26 This study uses an innovative approach to address a censoring problem in investment data by using real 
estate as a collateral. 
27 Gallego and Loayza (2000) find evidence, however, that firms eligible for investment in pension funds 
(PFMC-grade firms) were less financially constrained than non PFMC-grade firms before 1990. Since 
PFMC-grade firms tend to be larger than the average Chilean firm, this is consistent with they hypothesis 
that smaller firms were more financially constrained than larger firms during this period.   14
do not fall significantly after liberalization (even for small firms), but the authors admit 
that since financial reform was an ongoing process, it is difficult to clearly identify the 
“pre” and “post” reform episodes. They also admit that this time-series analysis is 
complicated by several macroeconomic events during this period, including severe 
inflation in 1988, a major earthquake, loose fiscal policy, and a sharp reduction in credit 
provided by the central bank.  
 
A final country study of the impact of financial market liberalization on financial 
constraints is Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994). This study examines Indonesian 
manufacturing establishments and suffers from similar time-series identification 
problems as Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996). With this caveat, the study finds 
that liberalization improves access to financing for all types of firms, but may increase 
borrowing costs, especially for smaller firms. The study suggests that the movement from 
preferential credit to lending based on market mechanisms can increase the overall 
availability of financing, but may simultaneously raise the cost of capital for individual 
firms that previously benefited from preferential access to credit.  
 
C.  Summary 
This series of cross-country and individual case studies on the impact of capital controls, 
capital account liberalization, and broader financial market liberalization on the supply 
and cost of capital has several key themes. First, liberalization tends to reduce the cost of 
capital and ameliorate financial constraints, on average, two effects that are consistent 
with liberalizations increasing the supply of capital. Second, smaller firms and companies 
that did not previously have access to international capital markets are more likely to 
experience these benefits of liberalizations. Third, certain types of firms in several 
countries may have benefited from capital controls and more restricted financial markets, 
possibly through preferential lending agreements. These companies were less likely to 
benefit from reduced financial constraints after liberalizations, and may even face a 
higher cost of capital. This set of microeconomic results clearly suggests that capital 
controls can reduce the supply and increase the price of capital, making it more difficult 
for many firms to obtain financing for productive investment. Although experiences vary   15
across countries, these effects are generally greatest for smaller firms, firms in less 
distorted financial markets, and firms without access to international capital markets or 
preferential lending arrangements. This impact of capital controls on small firms could be 
particularly important for emerging markets in which small and new firms are often 
important sources of job creation and economic growth. 
 
 
IV.  Capital Controls and Market Discipline 
Capital controls can not only reduce the supply and increase the cost of capital, but they 
can insulate an economy from competitive forces, reducing market discipline and 
allowing capital to be allocated inefficiently. Some of the results discussed in the last 
section were consistent with this effect—although none of the studies tested it explicitly.  
An additional series of microeconomic papers, however, tests whether capital controls 
affect market discipline through three closely related channels: through the efficiency 
with which capital is allocated, through the government’s ability to channel resources 
inefficiently, and through the information content in asset prices.  
 
A.  Capital Controls and the Allocation of Capital 
Chari and Henry (2004a) is the most careful study directly testing for the impact of 
capital controls on the allocation of capital. This study examines how stock market 
liberalizations in emerging markets affect investment and the return to capital for 
different types of firms. It finds that firms with better fundamentals before liberalization 
have a greater increase in capital investment after liberalization. Moreover, this effect of 
firm characteristics on the allocation of investment can outweigh the average effects on 
all equities from liberalization. For example, the paper’s baseline estimates show that a 1 
percentage point increase in a firm’s expected future cash flow (indicating stronger 
fundamentals) predicts a 4.1 percentage point increase in its investment ratio after 
liberalization. In comparison, the country-specific impact of liberalization on the cost of 
capital only predicts a 2.3 percentage point increase in investment. The authors conclude 
that stock market liberalizations do “not constitute a wasteful binge” and that the   16
“invisible hand” is “discerning” in its ability to allocate capital to firms with higher 
expected returns after liberalizations.  
 
A number of studies focus on how liberalizations in areas other than equity markets affect 
the allocation of investment across firms. Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2003) 
assesses if banking sector liberalizations (which include reducing barriers to foreign 
investment as well as other reforms) improve the efficiency with which investment is 
allocated in 12 developing countries. The study measures the efficiency of the allocation 
of capital using an index measuring if investment funds go to firms with a higher 
marginal return to capital. The return to capital is measured using panel estimates of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Results show that liberalizations increase the 
efficiency of the allocation of investment in the majority of emerging markets in their 
sample. Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1992) focuses on a broader definition of 
financial market liberalization (including the banking sector as well as other financial 
markets) and only include firms in Ecuador during its period of liberalization in the 
1980’s. They also find that liberalization increases credit flows to more “technically 
efficient” firms, although the time-series framework in this study has several problems 
(as discussed in Section III.B).  
 
Several microeconomic studies have also tested for a relationship between the allocation 
of capital and overall financial development, as measured by the size of a country’s 
equity and credit markets relative to GDP. This measure has a positive, although even 
weaker relationship to capital controls than measures of financial market liberalizations 
(as discussed above). Nonetheless, the results from these studies are consistent with the 
results on how capital controls affect the allocation of capital. For example, Wurgler 
(2000) uses industry-level data to show that investment growth is more closely associated 
with the growth in value-added (a measure of the return to capital) in countries with more 
developed financial systems. Rajan and Zingales (1998) shows that industries that are 
more reliant on external financing grow faster in more financially developed countries,   17
suggesting that financial development reduces firms’ costs of external finance.
28 These 
results suggest that capital is allocated more efficiently in countries with more developed 
or deeper financial markets. 
 
Abiad, Oomes and Ueda (2004) also examines the relationship between financial markets 
and the allocation of capital, but explicitly tests for differences in the relative importance 
of financial liberalization (the focus of the papers at the beginning of this section) and of 
overall financial development (the focus of the papers in the above paragraph). This study 
also develops a new method for measuring the efficiency of the allocation of capital. 
More specifically, it uses the dispersion in Tobin’s Q in a given country and year (after 
controlling for other factors) to proxy for the variation in expected returns. A lower 
variation in returns is interpreted as indicating that capital is allocated more efficiently, 
because if a country removes its capital controls, then credit should be reallocated from 
firms with lower expected returns to firms with higher expected returns, thereby raising 
expected returns for the former group and reducing them for the later. The study finds 
that financial liberalization (which includes entry barriers for banks, restrictions on 
international financial transactions, credit and interest rate controls, privatization and 
other regulations) improves the allocation of credit across firms. In contrast, financial 
deepening (which is measured by the volume of credit being intermediated in financial 
markets) affects firms’ access to finance but is a less important determinant of the 
allocation of capital. 
 
B.  Capital Controls and Government’s Allocation of Resources 
In developed countries, the allocation of capital and investment is largely determined by 
financial markets. In emerging markets and developing countries, however, the 
government often plays a more important role. Moreover, capital controls can insulate 
governments from market discipline, giving government agencies greater freedom to 
allocate capital based on factors other than the expected returns to investment. Therefore, 
instead of testing for the general impact of capital account liberalization on the allocation 
                                                 
28 Reliance on external financing is measured by the industries’ reliance on external financing in the United 
States.   18
of a capital, an alternate approach is to test if liberalization affects the government’s 
ability to allocate capital to preferred companies. 
 
One paper that uses this approach is Johnson and Mitton (2002). This study examines 
how the Asian crisis and the announcement of Malaysia’s capital controls affected stock 
returns for individual Malaysian companies. It splits the sample into firms with political 
connections to senior government officials (such as Prime Minister Mahatir), and those 
without political connections. The paper finds that in the initial phase of the crisis (before 
the capital controls were enacted), politically-connected firms experienced a greater loss 
in market value than firms without political connections. When the controls were put into 
place, politically-connected firms experienced a relatively greater increase in market 
value. These results suggest that the Asian crisis initially increased financial pressures on 
Malaysian firms, improving market discipline and reducing the expected ability of the 
government to provide subsidies for favored firms. When the capital controls were put 
into place, however, investors expected that the Malaysian government would have more 
freedom to help favored firms, thereby reducing market discipline.  
 
Moreover, the empirical estimates in Johnson and Mitton (2002) suggest that this effect 
of the Malaysian capital controls on expected market discipline was substantial. In the 
initial phase of the crisis (from July 1997 to August 1998), politically-connected firms 
lost about $5.7 billion in market value due to the fall in the expected value of their 
connections. When the controls were enacted in September 1998 (and market values were 
substantially lower), politically-connected firms gained about $1.3 billion in market value 
due to the increased value of their connections. Another calculation indicates that at the 
end of September 1998, after the capital controls had reduced market discipline, political 
connections were worth about 17% of the total market value for connected firms. 
 
C.  Capital Controls and Asset Market Pricing 
Capital controls can also impact the allocation of capital by affecting the liquidity of asset 
markets and the efficiency of asset market pricing. Controls on capital inflows can make 
it more difficult for foreigners to invest in domestic financial markets, therefore reducing   19
a valuable source of investment and liquidity. On the other hand, controls on capital 
outflows could increase liquidity by keeping funds inside the country. Similarly, 
restrictions on domestic companies’ ability to raise financing abroad could foster the 
development and liquidity of domestic financial markets. Controls on either capital 
inflows or outflows, however, could reduce competitive pressure and market discipline, 
thereby reducing the information content of asset prices. This effect could be particularly 
important in less developed financial markets, where foreign investors can have greater 
experience valuing assets and therefore provide more reliable pricing information. 
Therefore, the impact of capital account liberalization on asset market liquidity and 
pricing efficiency must be resolved empirically. This is an important issue not only in and 
of itself, but also because stock market mispricing can affect a number of firm-level 




Li, Morck, Yang and Yeung (2004) is one study that provides evidence on how capital 
account liberalization could affect the efficiency of asset pricing. This study examines the 
extent to which individual stock prices move up and down together in specific 
countries—what is also called “synchronicity”. High levels of comovement and low 
levels of firm-specific variation in prices suggest that stock prices are less efficient. In 
other words, when stock prices are driven more by aggregate, country-level news instead 
of by firm-specific variables and information, there is less market discipline. This paper 
uses several different measures to show that greater openness in capital markets (but not 
in goods markets) is correlated with a greater firm-specific content in stock prices. 
Therefore, greater openness in capital markets is associated with more market discipline 
and more efficient stock market pricing. This relationship is magnified in countries with 
strong institutions and good governance.  
 
One set of results in the working paper version of Li, Morck, Yang and Yeung (2004) is 
particularly relevant to the previous discussion of the impact of the Asian crisis and 
                                                 
29 Different studies in this literature find different effects. See Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2004) for an 
overview.    20
Malaysian capital controls on stock market prices.
30 Around the time of the Asian crisis, 
the firm-specific variation in stock prices increased significantly in most Asian countries 
and remained high for an extended period. This pattern is graphed for Korea in Figure 4, 
and is typical of most open economies in the region. In Malaysia, the firm-specific 
component of stock prices also increased significantly after the Asian crisis, but then fell 
sharply after capital controls were imposed (as also shown on Figure 4). Although not a 
definitive test, this comparison supports the claim that the Asian crisis increased market 
discipline and the firm-specific content in stock prices, while the Malaysian capital 
controls suppressed market discipline and reduced the efficiency of stock market prices. 
 
Several studies have focused on an even narrower aspect of the relationship between 
capital controls and asset pricing by examining the impact of firms “migrating” abroad 
(i.e., of cross-listing on foreign stock markets, issuing depositary receipts, or raising 
capital directly in international markets). Capital controls can limit—or even restrict 
entirely—the ability of firms to access international capital markets through these 
channels. An extensive literature evaluates the impact of migration on firms that access 
international markets, as well as the corresponding impact on domestic firms that do not 
migrate. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) includes a summary of this literature. Firms which 
access international capital markets generally attain a lower cost of capital and greater 
trading liquidity. Levine and Schmukler (2004), however, show that migration reduces 
the trading activity and liquidity of domestic firms that do not raise capital 
internationally. Migration not only shifts some trading activity abroad, but also shifts 
trading activity within the domestic market away from purely domestic firms to the 
“migrated” firms. 
 
D.  Summary 
This series of cross-country and case studies on the impact of capital controls, capital 
account liberalization, and broader financial market development on market discipline 
and the allocation of capital provides several insights. First, capital controls can reduce 
                                                 
30 These results were removed from the published version of the paper but are included in the working 
paper version prepared for the conference on Global Linkages held at the IMF on January 30-31, 2003. The 
paper is available at: http://web.mit.edu/kjforbes/www/GL-Website/GL-Conference.htm   21
market discipline and insulate the economy from competitive forces. Second and closely 
related, financial development, and especially capital market liberalization, lead to a more 
efficient allocation of capital across firms. Third, these effects of capital controls work 
through a number of different channels—including effects on stock market valuations, 
access to financing, the government’s ability to channel resources inefficiently, and the 
efficiency of stock market pricing. Therefore, capital controls appear to have widespread 
effects on market discipline and the allocation of capital across firms, effects that are 
likely to reduce productivity and growth. 
 
 
V.  Capital Controls and the Behavior of Firms and Individuals 
Capital controls can cause firms and individuals to alter their behavior to minimize the 
costs created by the controls. This modification in behavior can result from the explicit 
tax imposed by the capital controls, as well as from the impact of capital controls on the 
supply and allocation of capital. In some cases, this modification of behavior can involve 
inaccurate or dishonest reporting or accounting in order to evade the controls outright. 
These types of attempts by firms and individuals to minimize the costs of capital controls 
can create additional distortions in an economy. 
 
A.  Capital Controls and Firm Behavior 
One careful study of how capital controls affect firm behavior focuses on U.S. 
multinationals. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) shows that U.S. multinationals adjust their 
trade patterns, profits and dividend repatriations in order to evade capital controls in other 
countries. For example, the study estimates that multinational affiliates are about 10% 
more likely to remit dividends to parent companies in the presence of capital controls, 
and that the distortions to profitability from capital controls are comparable to a 24% 
increase in the corporate tax rate. It also shows that the cost of borrowing is higher in 
countries with capital controls, and when this effect is combined with the other steps 
multinationals take to evade the controls, this reduces the size of foreign investment by 
multinationals by 13% to 16%. Therefore, capital controls can not only create widespread   22
distortions to how foreign companies behave in countries with controls, but they also 
reduce the total amount of foreign direct investment available to host countries.  
 
Another study that examines the effect of capital controls on firm behavior focuses on 
local firms instead of multinational affiliates. Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) uses firm-
level data from East Asia and Latin America for the 1980’s and 1990’s to examine how 
leverage ratios, debt maturity structures, and financing sources change when countries 
increase their integration with international equity and bond markets and undergo 
financial liberalization. The study finds that, on average, debt maturity tends to shorten 
but debt-equity ratios do not increase.  It also finds that domestic firms that participate in 
international markets obtain better financing opportunities and extend their debt 
maturities. Also, firms in economies with more developed domestic financial systems are 
less affected by liberalization. These results suggest that some, although not all, firms 
may have expanded financing opportunities when countries lift their capital controls and 
increase their integration with global financial markets. 
 
Instead of focusing on a cross-section of countries, several studies examine how capital 
controls affect firm behavior in an individual country. Forbes (2003) shows that the 
encaje (the Chilean tax on capital inflows discussed in Section III) caused companies to 
adjust their financial structure in a number of ways. For example, immediately after the 
encaje was enacted, there was a sharp increase in the number of firms choosing to issue 
stock that could then be cross-listed in the United States as American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs). Individuals trading stock listed as secondary ADRs could avoid paying 
the encaje. In 1995, however, the Chilean government closed this loophole and included 
ADRs under the encaje.  The number of Chilean firms issuing stock plummeted. Figure 5 
shows these distortions to Chilean stock listings created by the encaje and changes in its 
coverage. Cifuentes, Desormeaux, and González (2002) also discusses how changes in 
this ADR loophole affected the evolution of the Chilean stock market. This paper argues 
that the extension of the encaje to include secondary ADRs significantly reduced 
financial liquidity, transactions, and investment in the domestic stock market—a 
reduction which persisted even after the encaje was lifted.    23
 
Gallego and Hernández (2003) performs an even more detailed empirical analysis of how 
the encaje affected the financial decisions of Chilean firms. The study finds that the 
encaje caused firms to reduce their leverage ratios and paid capital, and increase their 
reliance on retained earnings. This suggests that the capital controls raised the cost of 
borrowing and of issuing equity, although the average magnitudes of these effects were 
fairly small. The study also finds that the encaje shortened the maturity of debt, while 
reducing the relative importance of short-term financial debt, indicating that firms shifted 
to other sources of short-term funding to avoid the tax (such as delaying tax payments 
and obtaining credit from suppliers). Moreover, one fairly consistent finding throughout 
the study is that estimates of the average effects of the capital controls mask significant 
differences across firms (as was found in the work discussed in Section III on the impact 
of the encaje on firm-financing constraints). Firms that were larger, belonged to a 
conglomerate, or were able to issue securities abroad were more likely to respond to the 
capital controls by reducing their leverage through increases in their capital base (instead 
of resorting to retained earnings). Other firms, and especially smaller firms, were more 
likely to respond to the capital controls by resorting to retained earnings for financing and 
increasing their reliance on short-term debt.  
 
Other than the cross-country and Chilean studies on how capital controls affect firm 
behavior, most other evidence relies on anecdotes instead of formal empirical analysis. 
Several of these case studies, however, provide more concise descriptions of exactly how 
companies adapt their behavior in order to avoid capital controls. Many of these 
mechanisms are difficult to test empirically—but they could explain some of the more 
general effects discussed throughout this paper. One such study by Loungani and Mauro 
(2001) focuses on Russia.
31 This paper provides a detailed description of different 
strategies followed by Russian firms to evade capital controls. For example, in order to 
take money out of the country, firms would overstate import payments, including the use 
of fake import contracts for goods and services. Companies would also create enterprises 
                                                 
31 Also see Tikhomirov (1997) for an excellent description of different methods used to evade capital 
controls in Russia.   24
with the sole purpose of presenting fake import contracts requiring advance payments, 
and then the enterprises would be dissolved once the funds had been transferred out of 
the country. Companies would also misrepresent export earnings, such as by under-
invoicing exports or exporting via an offshore subsidiary with a low recorded transfer 
price (so that the margin between the transfer and market prices could be deposited 
offshore). All Russian firms, however, were not equally adept at circumventing the 
controls, contributing to uneven competitive conditions and distorting the allocation of 
resources. The study presents evidence that firms’ ability to evade the capital controls 
was widespread and that, as a result, capital controls increased corruption and lowered 
economic efficiency in Russia.  
 
B.  Capital Controls and Individual Behavior 
Individuals, as well as firms, can modify their behavior to minimize the cost of capital 
controls—or even evade them outright. One compelling example is how individuals 
responded to the “corralito” enacted by Argentina at the end of 2001. The corralito 
restricted capital outflows and withdrawals from the banking system. During this period 
the stock market rose dramatically, despite a sharp economic contraction, a plummeting 
peso, and a banking system on the verge of collapse. Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and 
Tesar (2002) explains this apparent discrepancy. Investors dodged the capital controls by 
purchasing Argentine stocks for pesos, converting the stocks into ADRs, and then selling 
the ADRs in New York for dollars that could be deposited in U.S. bank accounts. The 
study estimates that the capital outflow through this single loophole was between $835 
million and $3.4 billion in just the four months staring in December 2001. Investors were 
willing to pay a substantial premium to evade the corralito—with some ADRs trading at 
a discount of over 40%. Once the conversion of Argentine shares into ADRs was 
prohibited, the premium returned to nearly zero. Figure 6 (replicated from the paper) 
shows these trends for one Argentine stock. Melvin (2003) also studies the same episode 
and reaches similar conclusions. The surge in the ADR premium during the period of the 
corralito reflects what investors were willing to pay to avoid the Argentine capital 
controls.  
   25
Several papers also describe how investors adjusted their behavior to avoid capital 
controls in Russia. For example, Tikhomirov (1997) provides a number of examples—
including how Russian citizens would hold foreign currency funds in banks abroad so 
that they could invest and utilize these resources more freely. Abalkin and Whalley 
(1999) discuss how Russian citizens would convert local currency holdings and bank 
deposits into dollars, partially to facilitate evasion of the controls.  
 
C.  Summary  
This series of microeconomic studies suggests that capital controls can cause widespread 
distortions in the behavior of firms and individuals. U.S. multinationals adjust their trade 
patterns, profits and dividend repatriations to evade the controls. Domestic companies 
adjust their debt maturities and financing structures when capital controls are lifted. 
Individuals are willing to pay a substantial premium for a financial transaction that allows 
them to evade controls. Companies and individuals adopt numerous accounting gimmicks 
—including creating temporary corporations—simply to dodge the controls. These 
widespread distortions to firm and individual behavior resulting from the capital controls 
are likely to be inefficient. 
 
 
VI.  The Enforcement of Capital Controls 
Since firms and individuals will respond to capital controls by adjusting their behavior, 
enforcing the controls and ensuring they are effective can not only be a challenge, but 
also involve substantial administrative costs. Implementing capital controls is often a 
dynamic process. After a system of controls is specified, firms and individuals often find 
ways to evade the controls, diminishing their effectiveness over time. Governments that 
do not wish to see the effectiveness of the controls weakened will need to constantly 
adopt new controls and regulations in order to close loopholes and respond to the 
adjustments in behavior that resulted from the initial controls. Countries with weak 
institutions, especially a weak rule-of-law and high levels of corruption, are even less 
likely to be able to implement and enforce capital controls. Moreover, by providing an   26
opportunity for government officials to collect rents, capital controls can increase 
incentives for corruption and undermine institutions. 
 
There is extensive anecdotal evidence from different countries on the difficulty faced by 
governments attempting to enforce capital controls and the link between capital controls 
and corruption. For example, Tikhomirov (1997) provides a fairly detailed account of the 
attempts by the Russian government to limit illegal capital flight. Despite continually 
passing new rules and regulations in order to improve the government’s control over 
capital flows, many of these rules were highly ineffective and capital flight was 
extensive. Different sources suggest that capital flight from Russia between 1990 and 
1995 was somewhere in the very wide range of $35 billion to $400 billion. The study 
asserts that: “…instead of cutting profits from the illegal transfer of foreign currency 
funds abroad, these measures [the controls] spread the corruption from the foreign trade 
sector to the bureaucracy and, later, to the banking sector.”
32 Russia’s challenges in 
enforcing capital controls however, could partially result from the weak institutions in the 
country during the period of this study. 
 
The Chilean experience with the encaje (discussed above) therefore provides a useful 
contrast. Chile has sound institutions, a strong rule-of-law, and low levels of corruption. 
Despite these advantages, the government was constantly modifying the encaje in order 
to close new loopholes that were discovered by firms and investors. These changes 
included everything from the types of inflows covered, to the currency with which to pay 
the tax, to restrictions on rolling-over maturing investments.
33 Moreover, despite Chile’s 
constant attempts to raise the amount of the tax, tighten the capital controls, and close 
loopholes, there is some evidence that the effectiveness of the controls may still have 
declined over time.
34 Central bank data show that in 1992 the encaje covered about half 
                                                 
32 Tikhomirov (1997), pg. 595. 
33 See Simone and Sorsa (1999) or Ariyoshi et al. (2000) for detailed information on this evolution of 
capital account restrictions in Chile over the 1990s.  
34 For example, Cowan and de Gregorio (1998) calculate the “power” of the controls and argue that their 
power declined between 1995 and 1997 as evasion increased. Other studies, however, argue that the power 
of the controls increased steadily over time until they were removed in 1998. For example, see Gallego, 
Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) and Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998). Also see Simone and Sorsa 
(1999) for an overview of work on the evasion of the encaje.   27
of total gross capital inflows, but in subsequent years coverage declined to only 24% of 
inflows.
35 Despite these challenges enforcing the capital controls, however, the Chilean 
government still collected substantial revenues under the tax, suggesting that it still 
maintained some degree of effectiveness.
36 
 
Moreover, as new financial instruments continue to be developed and investors and firms 
become more adept at transferring capital across borders, it will become even more 
difficult to enforce capital controls. The recent case of Argentine investors using ADRs to 
evade the corralito provides a clear example of this challenge. After studying this 
experience, Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and Tesar (2002) suggests that once countries 
allow financial market development, “it may be difficult if not impossible to reverse the 




VII.  Conclusions 
Although the cross-country macroeconomic evidence on how capital account 
liberalization affects growth has yielded mixed results, to date, a series of microeconomic 
papers provides far more persuasive evidence on the diverse effects of capital controls 
and capital account liberalization. The studies surveyed in this paper present compelling 
empirical evidence that capital controls can affect the supply and cost of capital, market 
discipline, the allocation of resources, and the behavior of firms and individuals. Several 
studies also find that the effects of capital account liberalization vary across types of 
firms, reflecting different pre-existing distortions under capital controls. For example, 
although lifting capital controls tends to reduce financial constraints for most firms, it can 
have no effect (or even increase financial constraints) for firms that received preferential 
treatment under the controls or had already found ways to evade them.  
 
This microeconomic research on the impact of capital controls, however, is only in its 
                                                 
35 Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999). 
36 Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) report that between June 1991 and September 1998, the 
encaje increased central bank reserves by an average of 2.0% of GDP, or 40% of the average capital 
account surplus. 
37 Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and Tesar (2002), pg. 4.   28
infancy. Much more careful analysis is needed to better understand why capital account 
liberalization can have varied effects in different countries, and especially on what 
variables determine the success of liberalizations. For example, what are the 
microeconomic consequences of different sequencing when lifting capital controls? What 
are the microeconomic linkages between trade liberalizations and capital account 
liberalizations? How do different institutions interact with the microeconomic effects of 
capital controls? And are the benefits of capital account liberalization usually level 
effects or growth effects? 
 
Moreover, although this paper discusses how capital controls and financial liberalizations 
directly affect a series of microeconomic variables, it does not address a number of 
additional channels by which capital controls could affect key macroeconomic variables 
(such as exchange rates, the financial system, and/or monetary policy), which could, in 
turn, have additional effects on firms and individuals. For example, controls on capital 
outflows could reduce pressure on a currency to depreciate, and controls on capital 
inflows could reduce pressure on a currency to appreciate. Controls on capital outflows 
could help support a weak financial system, while controls on capital inflows could 
hinder the development of a deeper and more efficient financial market. Controls on 
capital inflows and outflows could create a wedge between domestic and foreign interest 
rates, thereby providing a country with more flexibility to follow an independent 
monetary policy. Changes in exchange rates, the financial system, and interest rates will, 
in turn, affect a range of microeconomic variables in the economy.
38 The paper also does 
not make any attempt to address the political economy of capital controls, such as 
analyzing what factors determine whether a country is more likely to adopt controls or 
liberalize its capital account.
39 
 
Although this survey does not address a number of questions, largely due to the limited 
microeconomic evidence that currently exists on these issues, it does present a series of 
convincing results on the effects of capital controls and benefits from capital account 
                                                 
38 For example, see Forbes (2002a, b) for a literature review and analysis of just the single topic of how 
depreciations affect different measures of firm performance. 
39 For a discussion of these political economy questions, see Johnston and Tamirisa (1998).   29
liberalizations. Although some specific effects vary across country experiences, capital 
controls generally reduce the supply of capital, increase the price of capital, and increase 
financial constraints, especially for smaller firms, firms in less distorted financial 
markets, and firms without access to international financial markets or preferred access to 
credit. Capital controls can insulate an economy from competitive forces, reducing 
market discipline and hindering the efficient allocation of capital through several 
channels. Capital controls can also cause widespread distortions in behavior, affecting 
multinationals, domestic companies and individuals. Moreover, administering capital 
controls requires a recurrent cost by the government, especially to enforce the regulations 
and update rules to close loopholes. These widespread effects of capital controls suggest 
that even though they may yield limited benefits in certain circumstances, they also have 
substantial and often unexpected economic costs. Capital controls are no free lunch.    30
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Figure 1: Conditional Relationship Between Financial Openness 
and Growth
Notes: Growth is measured by growth in real per capita GDP. Conditioning variables 
are: initial income, initial schooling, average investment/GDP, political instability, and 
regional dummies 
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Figure 3: Growth in Investment / Capital Ratios for Chilean Firms









Figure 4: Firm-Specific Variation in Stock Prices
Note: Higher levels of firm-specific variation in stock prices indicate greater pricing efficiency.
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Figure 6: Argentine and U.S. Prices and Premia for Perez Companc
Source: Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and Tesar (2002), Figure 6.  
 